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Abstract 
The monetary policy reaction function of the Bank of England is estimated by the 
standard GMM approach and the ex-ante forecast method developed by Goodhart 
(2005), with particular attention to the horizons for inflation and output at which each 
approach gives the best fit. The horizons for the ex-ante approach are much closer to 
what is implied by the Bank’s view of the transmission mechanism, while the GMM 
approach produces an implausibly slow adjustment of the interest rate, and suffers 
from a weak instruments problem. These findings suggest a strong preference for the 
ex-ante approach. 
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I. Introduction 
In this paper we focus on two particular issues in the estimation of a monetary policy 
reaction function, for the case of the Bank of England. The first issue concerns the 
time horizon of the forward-looking variables in the regressions, where the standard 
approach as identified by Favero (2001, ch. 7) specifies a 12-month lead on inflation 
and current output.1 These leads are at odds with published statements by the Bank of 
England which emphasise that the full ‘impact of a change in interest rates on 
consumer price inflation takes up to about two years’, while the corresponding lag for 
output is up to about one year.2 Moreover, the Bank’s inflation forecast two years out 
is rarely far from the formal inflation target. The implication is that the Bank sets 
interest rates primarily in response to forecasts for inflation around eight quarters 
ahead (and output around four quarters ahead), and this is how it is generally believed 
to operate. 
The second issue is the role of a lagged dependent variable in the reaction 
function, where the standard approach includes such a variable and interprets its 
presence as allowing for interest rate smoothing, that is, the gradual adjustment of the 
policy interest rate together with the minimisation of reversals in the trend of the 
policy rate (Goodhart, 1999).3 However, there is considerable doubt as to whether the 
Bank of England really smoothes (see, for example, Cobham, 2003), and some former 
members of the Monetary Policy Committee have rejected the claim (see, for 
example, Goodhart, 2005). Similar doubts have been expressed with respect to 
smoothing by the Federal Reserve Board in the US, notably by Rudebusch (2002, 
2006).4   
In order to investigate these issues further, we compare the results of two 
different techniques for estimating the Bank of England’s reaction function, for the 
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period 1997 to 2007: the standard approach exemplified by Clarida, Galí and Gertler 
(1998, 2000) and what we shall call the ‘ex ante forecast’ approach used by Goodhart 
(2005). The crucial difference between these two is that the former implicitly uses 
‘forecasts’ of inflation and the output gap generated within the GMM estimation 
procedure, whereas the latter ‘recovers’ an approximation of the forecasts of inflation 
and output growth which the policy makers had in front of them when they set interest 
rates, from the forecasts which the policymakers subsequently published (which 
include the effects of their interest rate decisions). 
Section 2 introduces the issues and the two estimation approaches. Section 3 
presents the results of estimations of the standard approach over the period since the 
Bank was given control of interest rates (operational independence) in mid-1997, with 
varying leads on inflation and the output gap. Section 4 extends and confirms 
Goodhart’s (2005) findings, and shows the results of systematic variation of the leads 
on inflation and output growth. Section 5 compares the two sets of findings. In 
conclusion, section 6 argues that the ex ante forecast method casts much more light on 
policymakers’ decisions, and should be the preferred method for investigation in the 
future. 
 
II. The two approaches 
Taylor put forward his instrument rule for monetary policy in 1993 both as a 
recommendation of how policy should be operated and as a rough description of what 
the Federal Reserve Board had done in recent years. Since then there has been a large 
amount of empirical work designed to identify how exactly different central banks in 
different periods have behaved. 
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The tone for this work was set by the work of Clarida, Galí and Gertler 
(hereinafter CGG) (1998), which developed an errors-in-variables/Generalised 
Methods of Moments (GMM) approach to estimate monetary policy reaction 
functions and applied it to the US, Japan and Germany (the ‘G3’ countries) and 
France, Italy and the UK (the ‘E3’). In the first three an interest rate (typically the 
three month interbank rate) was regressed in a forward-looking manner on the output 
gap and on inflation, with a lagged dependent variable which was interpreted as 
allowing for interest rate smoothing.  
CGG’s 1998 paper was also one of the first attempts to estimate a reaction 
function for the UK.5 They included the German short term interest rate as an extra 
explanatory variable on the grounds that the UK was managing its currency against 
the Deutsche Mark (DM) over their period, which extended from the start of the 
Thatcher government in June 1979 to the UK’s entry into the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the European Monetary System in October 1990.6 When this variable 
was not included the inflation coefficient was just under unity; but when it was 
included the inflation coefficient was only 0.48 but the coefficient on the German 
interest rate was 0.60. CGG interpreted this as suggesting that the Bank of England set 
interest rates as a weighted average of the German rate (with a weight of 0.6) and a 
domestic policy rule (weight 0.4) with an inflation coefficient of 1.20. CGG used 
leads of zero on output and 12 months on inflation; they justified the latter as follows: 
“Based on our casual sense of how central banks operate, we choose a horizon of one 
year… Policy makers… are more concerned about medium and longer term trends [in 
inflation]… the year ahead forecast seems a good indicator of the medium term trend 
in inflation” (1998: 1042).7 The coefficient on their lagged dependent variable was 
0.87. 
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Key features of some other investigations of the UK which use broadly the same 
approach are identified in Table 1. Angeloni and Dedola (1999) and Kuttner and 
Posen (1999) use the same leads as CGG: 12 months for inflation and zero for the 
output gap. Adam, Cobham and Girardin (ACG) (2005) used 9 and zero (which 
emerged from a wider search across a grid of periods).  Nelson (2000) used leads of 
zero or one, for both quarterly and monthly data. Most estimates for the lagged 
dependent variable were around 0.85 for monthly data, but Nelson had lower values 
especially, as would be expected, when he used quarterly data. 
A different approach, with different results, was used by Goodhart (2005). 
Instead of instrumenting within a GMM (or IV) framework, Goodhart reconstructs 
what he calls ex ante forecasts of inflation and output growth: these are the forecasts 
that the MPC would have had in front of it before it made the interest rate changes, 
derived by applying information from the Bank of England’s published statement on 
‘The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy’ (Bank of England, 1999) about 
the effects of interest rate changes on future inflation and output growth to the 
published quarterly forecasts.8  He then uses these forecasts, in the form of their 
deviations from the inflation target and the underlying trend of output growth, 
respectively, in OLS regressions. He does this first with the level of the policy interest 
rate as the dependent variable and then, when the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable turns out to be insignificantly different from unity, with the change in the 
policy rate regressed on the (deviations of the) levels of the inflation and output 
growth forecasts. And in each case he considers leads on inflation and output growth 
varying (together) from zero to eight quarters.  
The results are in striking contrast to those of the standard approach. Goodhart 
gets a much better fit for the regressions where the time horizon is seven or eight 
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quarters (on both inflation and output growth), and in these cases the coefficients on 
inflation are significantly above unity (so that the Taylor Principle that real interest 
rates should rise in response to a rise in inflation is fulfilled) while the coefficients on 
output growth are typically not significant. In addition lagged terms on the change in 
the policy rate turn out to be insignificant, which Goodhart interprets as implying that 
the MPC does not engage in ‘gradualism’. 
In the next two sections we present comparable results for the standard and the 
ex ante forecast approaches, using quarterly data over the same time period (1997 Q3 
to 2007 Q4).9 We confirm that the basic results of Goodhart’s analysis (which only 
went up to 2003 Q3) hold for the longer period. And we estimate both approaches 
over a full ‘grid’ of leads on inflation and the output gap (for the standard approach) 
or output growth (for the ex ante forecast approach), varying each lag separately from 
zero to eight quarters (however, we restrict the lead on the output variable to be equal 
to or less than that on inflation, in line with conventional ideas on the transmission 
mechanism). We then compare these two sets of results in section 5, and conclude in 
section 6. 
 
III. Estimates for the standard approach 
Here we follow closely the method pioneered by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998). 
The specification we estimate is    
rt= (1-ρ)α + (1-ρ)βπ t+j  + (1-ρ)γyt+k   + ρrt-1 + υt     (1) 
where the interest rate r reacts to inflation π and the output gap y, (1-ρ)α is the 
constant term, and a lagged dependent variable is included on the right hand side to 
allow for smoothing, in line with the standard approach. This equation can be thought 
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of as being derived from a Taylor rule for the ‘desired’ policy rate and a partial 
adjustment of the actual rate towards the desired level, as follows: 
 r*t= α + βπ t+j  + γyt+k          (2) 
 rt = (1-ρ)r*t + ρrt-1  + εt        (3) 
The error term in the estimating equation (1) consist of  two parts: the forecast error 
and the exogenous shock,  
υt   = - {(1-ρ)β(π t+j  - Et π t+j ) + (1-ρ)γ(yt+k   - Et yt+k ) } +  εt   
 (4) 
and it is assumed that the forecast errors are uncorrelated with the current interest rate. 
The coefficients to be estimated, i.e. (1-ρ)α, (1-ρ)β and (1-ρ)γ, are the short run 
coefficients; long run equivalents can be obtained by dividing these by (1-ρ) where ρ 
is the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. 
The Bank of England’s target was expressed in terms of the RPIX inflation index 
up to the end of 2003, and then in terms of the CPI (with the target itself being 
adjusted downwards from 2.5% to 2%, a change which was regarded as reflecting the 
difference in the index rather than a change of underlying objective). Since the Bank 
publishes the CPI for the years before 2004, we use those data here for the whole 
period. 
The output gaps for the UK, the US and the eurozone are constructed by 
detrending with the HP filter, with the smoothing parameter set to 1600.10  This 
technique was chosen as the most common method of detrending, but over this 
period, where the cyclical fluctuations are relatively small, the choice of technique is 
unlikely to make much difference (see Adam and Cobham, 2009).11 
The interest rate used is the official Bank rate. Other work in this vein has tended 
to use a 3-month interbank rate, but for an economy like the UK this rate may reflect 
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international arbitrage pressures as well as official policy decisions. ACG (2005: 512, 
Table 3) found that the policy rate produced results very close to those for the 
interbank rate, though they were also a little less well-defined. 
The basic idea of using GMM to estimate the reaction function comes from the 
orthogonal relationship between the instruments and the error term. As the error term 
υt  is correlated with the independent variables, we need some instruments which are 
highly correlated with inflation and the output gap but not with the forecast error and 
exogenous shock. We therefore include in the instrument set the variables used by 
Clarida et al., that is lagged interest rates, lagged inflation rates, lagged output gaps 
and the lagged world commodity price index, to which we add lagged output gaps for 
the US and the eurozone. 
Table 2 presents the values of β and γ (the long run coefficients on inflation and 
the output gap) derived from the coefficient estimates in regressions of (1), with j, the 
lead on inflation, and k, the lead on the output gap, varying from zero to eight 
quarters, but with k ≤ j. In each cell the upper number is the estimated value of β and 
the lower number is the estimated value of γ. Estimates in bold italics are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% significance level, those in bold (only) at the 5% level, 
those in italics (only) at the 10% level, and those in regular font are not significantly 
different from zero. Table 3 presents the root mean squared errors (RMSEs) for each 
of these regressions. 
From Table 3 the RMSEs vary between 0.266 and 0.329, with higher values 
towards the south-east of the table, where the leads are both closer to 8, and the lowest 
values at k = 1 and j = 3 or 4. Towards the south-east of the table the coefficients of β 
and γ as shown in Table 2 are typically insignificant, and in the case of γ often 
negative. For k ≤ 2 and j ≤ 6, on the other hand, the coefficients are typically positive 
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and significant, but although β is often > 1, γ is often > β. It seems clear, therefore, 
that the standard approach provides results which are stronger and partly in line with 
prior expectations (which would usually have γ < β), but only for  time horizons 
which are much shorter than those emphasised by the Bank of England and which are 
not consistent with the lags in the Bank’s view of the transmission mechanism. For 
horizons consistent with the MPC’s modus operandi, e.g. j = 8 and k = 4, the standard 
approach finds that the interest rate response to inflation is just under 1 and significant 
only at the 10% level, while the response to the output gap is significantly negative at 
the 5% level. 
Table 4 shows the values of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable for 
the same grid of regressions. These vary between 0.874 and 0.984. They tend to be 
higher and often not significantly different from unity towards the south-east of the 
table, but there is no clear pattern. For the ‘best’ fits with k = 1 and j = 3 or 4, 
however, the lagged dependent variable coefficients are significantly different from 
unity (and from zero) at 0.888 and 0.890. 
We have also estimated, but do not report for space reasons, the same equation 
but without a lagged dependent variable. In these regressions the inflation coefficient 
is nearly always negative, and often significantly less than zero, while the output gap 
coefficient is in most cases around 1 and significant.12 In addition the RMSEs are 
typically three to four times larger than those when the lagged dependent variable is 
included. It is clear, therefore, that to get ‘decent’ results it is essential to include the 
lagged dependent variable. 
Finally, given the recent emphasis by Mavroeidis (2004) and Consolo and 
Favero (2009) on the issues of identification and weak instruments,13 the results of 
applying the Cragg-Donald (1993) test for weak instruments are reported in Table 5. 
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This shows that in most cases, including the best fit cases k = 1 and j = 3 or 4, the 
regressions fail the weak instruments test (and this is despite the fact that we have 
extended the instrument set from that of CGG by including output gaps for the US 
and the eurozone).14 
  
IV. Estimates of the ex ante forecast approach 
Here we follow the method set out by Goodhart (2005), the first step in which is to 
reconstruct the ex ante forecasts of inflation and output growth, that is the forecasts 
the MPC would have had in front of it before it made its interest rate decisions.15 This 
is done by calculating the effects of the interest rate decisions on inflation and output 
growth on the basis of the parameters in the Bank’s model of the transmission 
mechanism, and subtracting these effects from the ex post forecasts published each 
quarter (which naturally include the effects of the decisions taken).16 The details of 
the method are set out in Appendix A (available below) and the resulting calculations 
are available in the working paper version of this paper. Figure 1 illustrates the 
results: it shows the resulting ex ante forecasts for inflation, together with the 
published ex post forecasts, for two particular horizons, four and eight quarters ahead. 
The four quarter ahead forecasts in Figure 1(a) fluctuate widely but are always close 
to each other, which reflects the fact that the changes in the policy rate which are 
included in the ex post but not the ex ante forecast have only small effects within this 
time horizon (and the incidence of no-change quarters). The eight quarter ahead 
forecasts in Figure 1(b) are less close to each other, the ex post forecast in particular 
fluctuates less widely (it remains nearly always within 0.2% of the target) and they 
both show a distinct fall in 2004 when the inflation target was changed from 2.5% on 
the RPIX to 2% on the CPI.  
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Once these forecasts are available, they can be used in simple OLS regressions to 
find how interest rate decisions are related to them. The first specification which 
Goodhart estimated was 
 rt= a + b(Et π t+j – π*)+c(Et gt+k – g*)+drt-1 +εt         (5) 
where the policy interest rate r reacts to the difference between forecast and target 
inflation π and the difference between forecast and trend output growth g, a is the 
constant, and a lagged dependent variable is included on the right hand side. 
Inflation is the four-quarter growth of the RPIX index up to the first quarter of 
2004, with the target at 2.5%, and then the four quarter growth of the CPI, with the 
inflation target at 2%. Output growth here is the growth of GDP since four quarters 
before, with trend growth set at 2.25%. The main reason for using output growth 
rather than the gap is that the Bank’s forecasts are for the former rather than the latter, 
but the evidence also suggests that the MPC reacts to the former rather than the latter, 
which it does not identify (Adam and Cobham, 2009). As Sauer and Sturm (2003) 
have shown, growth rate cycles tend to lead growth cycles, so that output growth can 
be seen as a forward indicator of the output gap: we should therefore expect a shorter 
lead on output growth than on the output gap. 
When Goodhart estimated equation (5) he found that the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable was insignificantly different from unity. He interpreted this 
as implying that the equation was misspecified, and went on to estimate an equation 
for the change in interest rates. We examined this directly by testing for unit roots (see 
Appendix B, below, for results). Although our period is longer than Goodhart’s, it is 
still rather short for unit root tests to have much power. However, the evidence 
indicates that the interest rate is stationary only in first difference form, whereas the 
deviation of inflation from target and output growth from trend may be stationary in 
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levels. In addition, Wald tests for the different horizons indicate that in nearly all 
cases, and certainly in the k = 0 or 1, j = 7 or 8, cases d is insignificantly different 
from 1. We therefore tested the following specification, which is a rearrangement of 
(5) for the case where d = 1: 
  ∆rt= a + b(Et π t+j – π*) + c(Et gt+k – g*) + e∆rt-1 + εt       (6) 
where ∆r is the first difference of the interest rate and, following Goodhart, we 
included a lagged term in this difference to test for gradualism. The results showed 
that the lagged dependent variable was almost always insignificant, so we dropped it 
in favour of the following specification: 
  ∆rt= a + b(Et π t+j – π*) + c(Et gt+k – g*) + εt        (7) 
which corresponds to Goodhart’s Table 12 equation.17 
Goodhart reported regressions of this equation for the nine cases from j = k = 0 
to j = k = 8, but we do this for the full grid, with j and k varying from zero to eight 
quarters but k ≤ j, in Table 6. Table 7 reports the corresponding RMSE and LM 
statistics.  
From Table 7 the RMSEs vary between 0.206 and 0.308, but they are 
systematically lower in the bottom two rows (j = 7 or 8) and the best fit, as indicated 
by the smallest RMSEs, is obtained when j = 7 or 8 and k = 1 or 2. The LM statistics 
reported indicate that none of the residuals suffer from serial correlation. In Table 6 
the values on the diagonal, where the leads on inflation and output growth are always 
the same, are broadly in line with what Goodhart found: as the horizon of the inflation 
and output growth deviations increases, the value of b increases while c is not 
significant at horizons of 7 and 8.  When we allow for differences in horizon between 
inflation and output growth, i.e. we consider the grid as a whole, it is clear that for j ≤ 
6 the inflation coefficients are < 1 and nearly always insignificant while the output 
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growth coefficients are positive and significant; but as j rises the estimated value of b 
rises, particularly after j = 5, and for j > 6 the inflation coefficients are significant and 
> 1, while the output growth coefficients become smaller and ultimately insignificant. 
In other words, the response of the interest rate to inflation is strongest for j = 7 or 8, 
while its response to output growth does not seem to vary systematically with k but is 
strongest for j = 3 to j = 5. In the group of cases where the RMSEs were lowest, that is 
j = 7 or 8 and k = 1 or 2, the inflation coefficients are > 1 and the output growth 
coefficients small but positive and significant; for the very lowest RMSE, where j = 8 
and k = 1, the inflation coefficient is 1.16 and the output growth coefficient is 0.17 
and significant. In this case b is also significantly greater than 1. On the other hand, in 
the cases where the standard approach finds the strongest relationships, i.e. j = 3 or 4 
and k = 1, the output growth coefficients are significant but the inflation coefficients 
are insignificant. 
 
V. Comparisons and comments 
Section 3 established three points on the standard GMM approach. First, this approach 
produces the best fits for horizons of three or four quarters on inflation and one 
quarter on the output gap, horizons which are broadly in line with those commonly 
used in this literature but are not in line with the horizons implied by the Bank of 
England’s understanding of the transmission mechanism or, more generally, by its 
typical emphasis on the inflation forecast two years out. Second, this approach treats 
the relatively high values for the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable which it 
obtains as implying a high degree of interest rate smoothing; such smoothing is also 
inconsistent with statements made by those involved in or close to the decision-
making process at the Bank. Third, the results at nearly all horizons suffer from the 
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weak instruments problem, which means that the distributions of the estimators and 
the test statistics may be distorted, and that conventional inference may be invalid.  
Section 4 established two corresponding points for the ex ante forecast approach. 
First, this approach produces the best fits for horizons of seven or eight quarters for 
inflation and one quarter for output growth: this inflation horizon is clearly consistent 
with the Bank’s own view of its activities, while the output growth horizon (when 
output growth is seen as a forward indicator of the output gap, which in turn affects 
inflation with a lag of around four quarters) seems broadly plausible. Second, when 
the equation is estimated in terms of the first difference of the interest rate as the 
dependent variable, lags of the change in interest rates are not significant, which 
suggests that there is no ‘gradualism’ in UK monetary policy. Moreover, although the 
econometrics (as opposed to the data used) are much simpler in this case, the 
approach does not seem to suffer from any obvious econometric shortcoming. 
The most likely explanation of the differences between the two reaction 
functions is that the ex ante forecast approach employs something close to the actual 
forecasts produced by the central bank, using the wide array of different information 
at its disposal together with the judgments of its forecasters, whereas the standard 
approach uses a limited set of instruments to generate implicit forecasts in a more 
mechanical way so that its implicit forecasts are much less close to what the 
policymakers were considering. 18  While it is not possible to back out the exact 
forecasts implied by the GMM approach, we can run OLS regressions for inflation as 
a function of all the instruments included in our GMM model, and use the result to 
predict the forecasts for inflation at different horizons (this is equivalent to carrying 
out the first stage of an IV procedure). Figure 2 graphs the four quarter ahead and 
eight quarter ahead ‘instrument forecasts’ for inflation generated in this way, together 
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with the ex ante forecasts.19 It is immediately apparent that the instrument forecasts 
are not close to the ex ante forecasts, particularly in the later part of the period; the 
correlation between the instrument and ex ante forecasts is 0.33 for four quarters 
ahead and 0.23 for eight quarters ahead. The implication is that the GMM model is 
trying to relate the policy rate to something which is quite distant from the forecasts 
which the policymakers were considering, and that would explain why it performs 
poorly.  
With respect to interest rate smoothing the conventional intuition for this is that 
the policymaker decides that the interest rate needs to be changed by a certain 
amount, but chooses to spread that change over a number of periods. This intuition 
suggests precisely that the change in the interest rate should be related to the previous 
period change (rather than that the level of the interest rate should be related to its 
previous level, which is the form used in the standard approach and identified there as 
interest rate smoothing). In that sense the intuition is better tested by the inclusion of 
the lagged change in the interest rate in a reaction function which has the change in 
the rate as the dependent variable, than by including the lagged level of the rate in a 
regression with the rate on the left hand side. But when smoothing is tested in this 
way in the ex ante forecast approach, it is rejected.  
The implications of the two different approaches for the issue of smoothing can 
be elucidated by considering the adjustment of the interest rate over time to an 
inflation shock which, once it occurs, is recognised and expected with certainty to 
continue. Figure 3 graphs the cumulative rise in the interest rate in response to a 
(continuing) 1% rise in expected inflation, everything else remaining equal, for the 
best fit on the standard approach (k = 1, j = 4). It takes between five and six quarters 
for the nominal interest rate to rise by 1%, i.e. for the real interest rate to exceed its 
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initial pre-shock level.20 This is disturbing: the outcome for inflation over the period 
considered here suggests that policy was in fact being operated in a stabilising manner 
(and/or that the Taylor Principle was fulfilled), but such slow adjustment of the 
interest rate appears to mean that inflation shocks had time and scope to destabilise 
the economy before policy reasserted itself. In the ex ante forecast approach (for the 
best fit case of j = 1 and k = 8), on the other hand, the interest rate rises in the first 
quarter by 1.16% so that the real interest rate exceeds its initial level by the end of the 
first quarter. 
Figure 4 sheds some further light on the standard approach. It shows the actual 
policy rate together with the predicted desired rate r*, which can be backed out from 
the regression using equation (2),  and the predicted short run rate, that is the 
predicted value of the dependent variable in the regression of equation (1). It is 
immediately apparent that the desired rate has a very poor fit with the actual rate, and 
that the much better fit of the short run rate relies heavily on the lagged dependent 
variable (which, given the magnitude of its coefficient, accounts for some 89% of the 
short run rate). In particular there are large fluctuations in the desired rate in 1999, 
2001-2, 2003-4 and 2005-6 which leave almost no trace on the much more stable 
short run rate.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper we have contrasted the standard GMM approach to estimating the 
monetary policy reaction function pioneered by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) to 
the ex ante forecast approach developed by Goodhart (2005), which requires only 
simple OLS estimation, for the case of the Bank of England. It turns out that the latter 
produces a picture of monetary policy which is much closer to the Bank’s own 
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description of what it does, both in terms of the time horizons which give the best fit 
and in terms of the absence of gradualism, while the former suffers from econometric 
weaknesses in the form of weak instruments. The most likely explanation of these 
differences is that the ex ante forecast approach employs the actual forecasts produced 
by the central bank, using the wide array of different information at its disposal 
together with the judgments of its forecasters, whereas the standard approach uses a 
more limited set of instruments to generate mechanically implicit forecasts that are 
not close to those the MPC considers. The evidence presented here suggest that this is 
a major weakness of the standard approach which casts doubt on the results it 
generates. This finding may also have implications for the use of GMM in other 
contexts. 
The implication is that economists who want to understand the policy process 
should try to apply the ex ante forecast method where possible. At present, few central 
banks publish forecasts that can be used in this way. This is unfortunate, for the 
standard approach is a very poor alternative. However, central banks must have the 
information required: in the name of transparency and in order for their decision-
making to be better understood, they could perhaps publish it retrospectively. 
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Notes
 
1 Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998: 1042) justify this horizon by saying merely that 
“Based on our casual sense of the way central banks operate, we choose a horizon of 
one year… Policymakers, we believe, are relatively unconcerned about the month to 
month variation in inflation and instead are more concerned about medium- and 
longer-term trends. In this respect, the year ahead forecast seems a good indicator of 
the medium term trend in inflation.” They go on to say, “Since forecasts over near-
term horizons are highly collinear, our results are not sensitive to small changes in the 
horizons we assume (e.g. changes in either direction of less than six to nine months).” 
2  The quotation is from http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/how.htm. 
See also Bean and Jenkinson (2001: 435). 
3 Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998: 1038) justify their introduction of partial adjustment 
simply as a way of capturing ‘the tendency of central banks to smooth changes in 
interest rates’, with one reference to early work on this issue by Goodfriend (1991).  
4 Rudebusch (2006, p. 95) notes that lagged dependence of this kind “is an extremely 
robust empirical result in the literature”, but he argues that this should not be taken as 
convincing proof of monetary policy inertia: the policymakers may be responding to 
some persistent omitted variables rather than partially adjusting the policy rate. In his 
2002 and 2006 papers he provides a range of evidence to the effect that partial 
adjustment at the inter-quarter frequency is not anticipated by the financial markets 
(which it surely would be if it occurred on a systematic basis). 
5 Earlier attempts include Chadha and Janssen (1997). 
6 There is no doubt that the pound-DM exchange rate was an important consideration 
in UK monetary policy from some point in the mid-1980s, and the UK ‘shadowed’ 
the DM between March 1987 and March 1988. But in the early years of the period 
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policy was aggressively domestic in orientation, with very little attention paid to the 
exchange rate or the external context (see Cobham, 2002). 
7 They also stated that their results were not sensitive to changes of 6-9 months in the 
lead on inflation, or to the introduction of a 3-6 month lead on output. 
8 Goodhart uses output growth (since four quarters earlier) because that is the variable 
for which the Bank publishes forecasts. As he points out, the Bank has not published 
explicit data for output gaps (see also Adam and Cobham, 2009: 105-7). 
9 Since the Bank of England publishes forecasts on a quarterly basis only, we can only 
do this with quarterly data. It should be noted that while Clarida, Galí and Gertler 
used monthly data in their (1998) paper they used quarterly data in their longer study 
(2000) of the US. 
10 GDP data from 1980 were used for the calculation of the UK output gap, and data 
from 1995 for the US and the eurozone. 
11 We follow the bulk of the literature in using ‘full sample’ rather than ‘real time’ 
estimates of the output gap. As Orphanides and van Norden (2002) have shown, real 
time output gaps are subject to what they call (p. 582) ‘the pervasive unreliability of 
end-of-sample estimates of the output trend’. The question of real time output gaps for 
the UK has been analysed in detail by Adam and Cobham (2009). They found that in 
periods with major fluctuations real time gaps estimated in the standard way turn out 
to be quite different from what policymakers believed at the time, precisely because 
of the above problem, while in periods like the Great Moderation (which covers the 
period considered here) different measures of the gap are all closer together so that 
less importance is attached to which measure is used.   
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12 For k = 1, j = 3 and j = 4, the inflation coefficients are significantly negative at -
0.20 and -0.29 respectively, while the output gap coefficients are significant at 1.02 
and 0.96. 
13 Mavroeidis (2004) emphasises that the weak instruments problem arises ‘naturally’ 
when the predictable variation in inflation is low relative to unpredictable future 
shocks. Consolo and Favero (2009) favour a reverse form of the regression with 
inflation as the dependent variable; in this case they find significantly less inertia in 
monetary policy. 
14  The results of weak instrument tests when these output gaps are excluded are 
broadly similar to those reported here. 
15 Following Goodhart, we consider together the changes in interest rate over the two 
months preceding the publication of each Inflation Report, with its forecasts, as well 
as the changes made in that month. Over the period as a whole just over half of all 
policy rate changes were made in Inflation Report months, when the MPC would have 
had in front of it a completely new forecast, as opposed to intervening months when 
no new full forecast would have been available.  
16 We use the RPIX forecasts up to 2004 Q1, when the MPC produced forecasts for 
both RPIX and CPI, and the CPI forecasts (with the lower target) thereafter.  
17 There is one difference: Goodhart appears to have excluded the constant term from 
his regressions, arguing that when he took the first difference of the dependent 
variable on the left hand side of equation (5) the constant would drop out. This would 
be correct if equation (6) was the result of differencing all the variables in (5), but if it 
is a matter of assuming that d = 1 and rearranging the constant should still be there. In 
fact, the constant term in our equation (7) regressions is typically insignificant. 
 21 
 
18  A possible alternative explanation for the superior performance of the ex ante 
forecast approach might be that it uses additional information, in the form of the 
MPC’s knowledge of its own likely changes in policy over the horizon period. But the 
ex post forecasts we use are those made on the assumption of constant interest rates, 
so in this sense they are comparable to those implied in the standard approach. 
19 For purposes of comparison we have reduced the ex ante forecasts for inflation up 
to February 2004 by 0.5% in order to ‘convert’ them from RPIX forecasts (on a target 
of 2.5%) to CPI forecasts (on a target of 2%), since the GMM model uses the CPI 
throughout. It should be noted that we cannot carry out the same exercise for output, 
because the standard approach uses the output gap and the ex ante forecasts are for 
output growth. 
20 Within the current framework we cannot calculate the response of the economy (or 
inflation) to the interest rate change. But insofar as the rise in the interest rate leads to 
reductions in expected inflation and the output gap, the rise in the interest rate will be 
slower and/or smaller. 
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TABLE1 
Selected tests of the standard approach 
 Period Inflation  Output  Lagged dependent 
variable 
Horizons Other variables and weight 
Clarida et al. 
(1998) 
1979M6-
1990M10 
0.48 0.28 0.87 (12,0) German interest rate 0.60 
Angeloni and 
Dedola (1998) 
1980M1-
1987M12 
0.72 0.60 0.87 (12,0) German interest rate 1.32, as well as 
M3, real exchange rate 
 1988M1-
1997M4 
0.32 0.73 0.86 (12,0) German interest rate 0.45, $/DM 
exchange rate 
Kuttner and 
Posen (1999) 
1984M1-
1989M12 
1.64 -0.21a 0.86 (12,0) -- 
 1992M10-
1999M4 
0.52a -0.29 0.79 (12,0) -- 
Muscatelli et al. 
(2002) 
1985Q1-
1999Q1 
1.40 0.57 not reported (1,0) -- 
Nelson (2000) 1979Q2-
1987Q1 
0.38 0.15 0.37 (0,0) -- 
 1987M3-
1990M9 
0.00 0.45 0.52 (--,0) German interest rate 1.11 
 1992Q4-
1997Q1 
1.27 0.47 0.29 (1,0) -- 
Adam, Cobham 
and Girardin 
1997M4-
2002M7 
1.89 1.30 0.85 (9,0) -- 
 
Note a not significant 
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TABLE 2 
Estimated values of β and γ by the standard approach with varying time horizons 
β 
γ 
k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 1.85 
4.17 
        
1 1.70 
4.10 
1.23 
3.26 
       
2 1.69 
3.57 
1.27 
3.23 
1.42 
2.09 
      
3 1.58 
3.54 
1.86 
3.60 
1.98 
2.65 
2.78 
-0.32 
     
4 2.06 
3.32 
2.13 
3.27 
2.68 
2.15 
3.97 
0.01 
3.60 
-0.86 
    
5 2.07 
3.34 
2.57 
4.18 
5.14 
4.87 
13.44 
-1.60 
8.93 
-3.52 
7.43 
-0.40 
   
6 2.01 
4.15 
1.72 
3.42 
3.20 
3.25 
3.68 
-0.09 
3.29 
-2.01 
3.38 
-0.49 
2.85 
0.64 
  
7 1.44 
4.02 
0.86 
3.44 
0.95 
2.51 
1.10 
-0.77 
1.33 
-1.98 
0.85 
-0.27 
0.80 
0.04 
0.81 
-0.04 
 
8 1.27 
3.82 
0.41 
3.06 
0.58 
2.26 
0.59 
-0.89 
0.92 
-2.03 
0.41 
-0.82 
0.48 
-0.26 
0.42 
-0.61 
1.36 
-3.77 
Notes: coding as follows: 
Bold and italic: significantly different from zero at 1% significance level 
Bold: significantly different from zero at 5% level 
Italic: significantly different from zero at 10% level 
Regular: not significantly different from zero at 10% level 
 
 
 
 26 
TABLE 3 
Root mean squared errors for standard approach regressions with varying time 
horizons 
RMSE k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 0.282         
1 0.287 0.283        
2 0.271 0.270 0.296       
3 0.273 0.267 0.294 0.311      
4 0.276 0.266 0.291 0.305 0.305     
5 0.272 0.269 0.288 0.304 0.304 0.302    
6 0.283 0.281 0.302 0 .312 0.313 0.311 0.311   
7 0.295 0.293 0.314 0.323 0.323 0.322 0.322 0.323  
8 0.297 0.298 0.319 0.329 0.328 0.327 0.328 0.329 0.328 
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TABLE 4 
Estimates of ρ for the standard approach 
ρ k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 0.883         
1 0.893 0.874        
2 0.879 0.874 0.902       
3 0.880 0.888 0.912 0.955      
4 0.892 0.890 0.907 0.947 0.948     
5 0.898 0.918 0.947 0.984 0.979 0.972    
6 0.929 0.906 0.947 0.966 0.967 0.963 0.952   
7 0.923 0.893 0.930 0.944 0.948 0.928 0.927 0.925  
8 0.908 0.882 0.924 0.944 0.945 0.919 0.925 0.919 0.951 
Notes: coding as follows: 
Bold and italic: significantly different from 1 at 1% significance level 
Bold: significantly different from 1 at 5% level 
Italic: significantly different from 1 at 10% level 
Regular : not significantly different 1 zero at 10% level 
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TABLE 5 
Cragg-Donald tests for weak instruments in standard approach 
C-D k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 5.107         
1 4.494 4.477        
2 5.086 7.106 7.038       
3 4.724 5.655 5.939 5.229      
4 4.3 5.633 9.227 6.788 7.547     
5 3.969 4.981 7.506 7.241 6.086 3.655    
6 2.378 2.951 3.375 2.961 3.299 3.143 3.257   
7 2.212 1.888 2.212 1.983 2.162 1.954 2.067 2.215  
8 6.603 4.751 7.006 6.344 7.104 4.159 5.289 3.85 2.87 
 
Stock-Yogo (2002) weak ID test critical values:  
5% maximal IV relative bias     20.65 
10% maximal IV relative bias     11.05 
20% maximal IV relative bias        6.07 
30% maximal IV relative bias        4.33 
10% maximal IV size               51.70 
15% maximal IV size              27.56 
20% maximal IV size              19.38 
25% maximal IV size              15.19 
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TABLE 6 
Estimates of a, b and c by the ex ante forecast approach 
a 
b 
c 
k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 -0.08 
0.07 
0.30 
        
1 -0.08 
0.03 
0.30 
-0.10 
-0.02 
0.37 
       
2 -0.10 
-0.07 
0.29 
-0.09 
-0.01 
0.37 
-0.11 
0.03 
0.36 
      
3 -0.11 
-0.09 
0.29 
-0.10 
-0.02 
0.37 
-0.10 
0.06 
0.36 
-0.11 
0.11 
0.33 
     
4 -0.07 
0.10 
0.29 
-0.07 
0.10 
0.36 
-0.07 
0.24 
0.35 
-0.07 
0.34 
0.33 
-0.08 
0.36 
0.36 
    
5 -0.04 
0.24 
0.27 
-0.06 
0.20 
0.35 
-0.05 
0.34 
0.33 
-0.05 
0.43 
0.31 
-0.06 
0.47 
0.34 
-0.10 
0.52 
0.42 
   
6 -0.01 
0.53 
0.22 
-0.04 
0.38 
0.32 
-0.04 
0.49 
0.31 
-0.04 
0.59 
0.28 
-0.05 
0.65 
0.30 
-0.07 
0.71 
0.37 
-0.07 
0.82 
0.35 
  
7 0.01 
1.36 
0.07 
-0.02 
1.03 
0.19 
-0.03 
1.04 
0.18 
-0.02 
1.16 
0.15 
-0.03 
1.23 
0.17 
-0.05 
1.27 
0.21 
-0.05 
1.39 
0.21 
-0.05 
1.48 
0.20 
 
8 -0.09 
1.43 
0.11 
-0.09 
1.16 
0.17 
-0.10 
1.20 
0.15 
-0.10 
1.34 
0.11 
-0.09 
1.37 
0.09 
-0.11 
1.45 
0.12 
-0.11 
1.57 
0.08 
-0.11 
1.62 
0.07 
-0.11 
1.65 
0.06 
Notes: significance determined by robust standard errors, coded as follows: 
Bold and italic: significantly different from zero at 1% significance level 
Bold: significantly different from zero at 5% level 
Italic: significantly different from zero at 10% level 
Regular: not significantly different from zero at 10% level 
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TABLE 7 
RMSE and LM statistics for the ex ante forecast approach 
RMSE 
LM 
(Prob.Chi -
square ) 
k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
j=0 0.302 
0.53 
        
1 0.303 
0.560 
0.254 
0.969 
       
2 0.308 
0.322 
0.254 
0.964 
0.256 
0.745 
      
3 0.307 
0.388 
0.254 
0.976 
0.255 
0.783 
0.274 
0.186 
     
4 0.303 
0.502 
0.253 
0.994 
0.248 
0.746 
0.261 
0.168 
0.273 
0.124 
    
5 0.299 
0.361 
0.250 
0.855 
0.243 
0.599 
0.255 
0.138 
0.266 
0.106 
0.271 
0.137 
   
6 0.288 
0.206 
0.244 
0.648 
0.237 
0.521 
0.249 
0.145 
0.258 
0.121 
0.261 
0.144 
0.283 
0.101 
  
7 0.231 
0.206 
0.212 
0.358 
0.211 
0.490 
0.215 
0.294 
0.217 
0.313 
0.214 
0.349 
0.219 
0.322 
0.223 
0.258 
 
8 0.217 
0.550 
0.206 
0.585 
0.213 
0.583 
0.219 
0.733 
0.218 
0.569 
0.221 
0.640 
0.223 
0.629 
0.224 
0.649 
0.225 
0.665 
 
 
 31 
Figure 1(a): Ex post and ex ante forecasts of inflation four quarters ahead 
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Figure 1(b): ex post and ex ante forecast of inflation eight quarters ahead 
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Figure 2(a): Instrument and ex ante forecasts of inflation four quarters ahead 
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Figure 2(b): Instrument and ex ante forecasts of inflation eight quarters ahead 
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Figure 3: The policy rate response to a rise in inflation 
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Figure 4: Actual, predicted desired (r*) and predicted short run policy rates 
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Appendix A: Reconstructing the ex ante forecasts 
 
To reconstruct the forecasts that that Monetary Policy Committee would have had in 
front of them before they made their interest rate decisions, we follow Goodhart 
(2005). First, we use data from Bank of England (1999) which gives the effect on 
inflation and output growth over successive quarters of changes in the policy rate, as 
in Table A1. Tables A2 and A3 give the forecasts for inflation and output growth 
published in successive Inflation Reports, that is what Goodhart calls the ex post 
projections. We then take the interest rate changes in the month in which each 
Inflation Report was published, together with any changes in the preceding two 
months, multiply these numbers by the numbers in Table A1 and apply them to 
Tables A2 and A3, in order to get the ex ante forecasts as in Tables A4 and A5. 
 
Table A1:  
 
a) effect of interest rate changes on inflation over successive quarters  
     quarters 
 
policy 
rate 
change 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0.25%    0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 
0.5%    0.02 0.06 0.1 0.12 0.15 0.15 
0.75%    0.03 0.08 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.24 
1%    0.04 0.11 0.18 0.25 0.32 0.32 
 
b) effect of interest rate changes on output growth over successive quarters  
     quarters 
 
policy 
rate 
change 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0.25% 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.04 
0.5% 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.08 
0.75% 0.03 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.12 
1% 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.16 
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Table A2: the ex-post projections of inflation 
 j=0 j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6 j=7 j=8 
1998-1 2.6 2.63 2.42 2.41 2.44 2.39 2.47 2.55 2.64 
1998-2 2.83 2.35 2.35 2.41 2.37 2.3 2.26 2.27 2.35 
1998-3 2.51 2.56 2.69 2.82 2.86 2.77 2.69 2.56 2.47 
1998-4 2.54 2.56 2.71 2.74 2.59 2.56 2.51 2.48 2.45 
1999-1 2.49 2.53 2.55 2.61 2.52 2.49 2.47 2.47 2.56 
1999-2 2.48 2.4 2.36 2.2 2.23 2.25 2.23 2.35 2.43 
1999-3 2.31 2.28 2.09 1.99 1.88 1.92 2.08 2.28 2.59 
1999-4 2.2 2.12 2.06 2.02 1.84 1.72 1.8 2.19 2.53 
2000-1 1.93 1.98 1.95 2.05 2.32 2.48 2.53 2.56 2.58 
2000-2 1.88 1.93 2.1 2.2 2.47 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.56 
2000-3 2.38 2.28 2.26 2.39 2.48 2.62 2.68 2.7 2.72 
2000-4 2.36 2.33 2.22 2.19 2.19 2.18 2.37 2.46 2.56 
2001-1 1.94 1.92 1.87 1.87 2.09 2.18 2.27 2.42 2.55 
2001-2 1.9 1.9 1.91 1.91 1.94 2.03 2.16 2.39 2.53 
2001-3 2.31 2.17 2.17 1.91 1.96 2.13 2.32 2.41 2.45 
2001-4 2 2.03 1.85 2.06 2.06 2.08 2.15 2.23 2.36 
2002-1 2.14 1.87 1.96 2.11 2.13 2.13 2.18 2.28 2.34 
2002-2 2.02 2.08 2.24 2.18 2.05 2.09 2.26 2.39 2.63 
2002-3 1.84 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.31 2.29 2.31 2.41 2.55 
2002-4 2.64 2.73 2.72 2.72 2.41 2.38 2.37 2.44 2.46 
2003-1 2.77 2.9 2.98 2.78 2.7 2.63 2.58 2.48 2.49 
2003-2 3.09 2.9 2.63 2.4 2.35 2.4 2.4 2.44 2.46 
2003-3 2.85 2.58 2.3 2.31 2.29 2.28 2.36 2.49 2.64 
2003-4 2.72 2.55 2.64 2.66 2.61 2.56 2.47 2.54 2.65 
2004-1 2.32 2.51 2.51 2.53 2.6 2.45 2.43 2.46 2.58 
2004-2 1.46 1.36 1.39 1.44 1.63 1.77 1.85 2.1 2.27 
2004-3 1.18 1.22 1.32 1.39 1.55 1.57 1.7 2.04 2.1 
2004-4 1.18 1.2 1.36 1.56 1.64 1.72 1.82 1.93 2.01 
2005-1 1.54 1.58 1.65 1.72 1.79 1.88 1.98 2.06 2.12 
2005-2 1.98 2.06 2.1 2.01 1.86 1.89 1.91 1.93 1.97 
2005-3 2.16 2.3 2.18 1.98 1.86 1.73 1.84 2.01 2.05 
2005-4 2.23 2.16 2.03 1.84 1.75 1.79 1.81 1.87 1.95 
2006-1 1.96 1.94 1.96 1.98 2 2 2 2 2 
2006-2 2.27 2.19 2.33 2.35 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.14 2.11 
2006-3 2.32 2.71 2.75 2.55 2.35 2.18 2.21 2.14 2.11 
2006-4 2.56 2.67 2.36 2.06 2.04 2.03 2.02 2.03 2.03 
2007-1 2.9 2.56 2.26 2.06 1.86 1.94 2.01 2.07 2.13 
2007-2 2.52 2.25 2.07 1.98 1.88 1.86 1.96 2 2.05 
2007-3 2.07 2.1 2.11 2.08 2.08 2.11 2.08 2.08 2.08 
2007-4 1.9 2.06 2.14 2.22 2.17 2.08 1.85 1.77 1.74 
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Table A3: the ex-post projections of GDP growth rate 
 k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=7 k=8 
1998-1 3.04 2.33 1.76 1.64 1.59 1.79 2.15 2.41 2.61 
1998-2 2.41 1.86 1.71 1.76 1.83 2.11 2.27 2.39 2.56 
1998-3 1.99 1.66 1.41 1.19 1.29 1.54 1.69 2.09 2.44 
1998-4 1.95 1.28 1.00 0.84 1.01 1.33 1.65 2.02 2.48 
1999-1 1.16 0.77 0.68 0.83 1.36 1.82 2.24 2.61 2.83 
1999-2 0.79 0.99 1.20 1.49 1.72 1.99 2.58 2.97 3.11 
1999-3 1.32 1.90 2.41 2.58 2.73 2.80 2.92 3.01 3.02 
1999-4 2.50 2.82 2.80 2.51 2.42 2.61 2.70 2.82 2.83 
2000-1 2.92 2.70 2.47 2.24 2.27 2.35 2.38 2.39 2.39 
2000-2 2.94 2.58 2.45 2.57 2.61 2.65 2.70 2.74 2.70 
2000-3 2.56 2.48 2.50 2.51 2.53 2.63 2.81 2.79 2.76 
2000-4 2.73 2.76 2.39 2.31 2.40 2.48 2.51 2.50 2.48 
2001-1 2.86 2.30 2.07 2.22 2.10 2.37 2.62 2.81 2.89 
2001-2 2.25 2.03 2.46 2.68 2.72 2.71 2.48 2.42 2.42 
2001-3 1.62 1.82 1.98 2.26 2.42 2.33 2.24 2.15 2.11 
2001-4 2.09 1.92 1.97 2.05 2.27 2.49 2.66 2.70 2.67 
2002-1 1.37 1.48 1.78 2.43 2.76 2.79 2.69 2.61 2.62 
2002-2 1.35 1.62 2.32 2.95 2.95 3.15 3.29 3.28 3.13 
2002-3 1.82 2.34 2.91 2.75 2.94 3.03 2.91 2.68 2.52 
2002-4 2.29 3.06 3.18 3.17 2.97 2.74 2.59 2.48 2.42 
2003-1 2.53 2.58 2.33 2.58 2.60 2.40 2.19 2.04 2.03 
2003-2 2.38 2.00 2.44 2.94 2.77 2.63 2.38 2.29 2.50 
2003-3 1.59 1.77 2.46 2.71 2.86 2.92 2.74 2.59 2.42 
2003-4 2.14 2.70 2.75 2.84 2.84 2.92 2.94 2.93 2.85 
2004-1 3.36 3.56 3.49 3.40 3.18 3.11 3.10 3.00 2.87 
2004-2 3.59 3.70 3.65 3.72 3.38 3.01 2.64 2.33 2.19 
2004-3 3.69 3.55 3.70 3.45 3.03 2.59 2.16 2.00 2.07 
2004-4 2.80 2.70 2.38 2.42 2.38 2.49 2.63 2.82 3.00 
2005-1 2.79 2.57 2.77 2.75 2.68 2.71 2.80 2.91 3.04 
2005-2 2.56 2.62 2.57 2.64 2.61 2.65 2.75 2.87 3.01 
2005-3 2.08 2.11 2.40 2.58 2.74 2.94 3.20 3.29 3.29 
2005-4 1.92 2.26 2.36 2.59 2.77 3.04 3.27 3.33 3.27 
2006-1 2.22 2.48 2.83 3.01 3.12 3.18 3.19 3.12 3.02 
2006-2 2.60 2.86 3.05 3.10 2.98 2.89 2.81 2.75 2.71 
2006-3 3.12 3.20 3.21 3.17 2.98 2.95 2.90 2.82 2.73 
2006-4 2.88 3.01 3.08 3.11 3.02 2.95 2.92 2.88 2.86 
2007-1 3.09 3.20 3.31 3.24 3.11 2.94 2.84 2.80 2.80 
2007-2 2.87 2.97 3.08 3.14 3.05 2.96 2.87 2.78 2.75 
2007-3 3.01 2.89 2.85 2.72 2.63 2.55 2.51 2.45 2.47 
2007-4 3.19 2.80 2.31 1.93 2.01 2.20 2.45 2.68 2.74 
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Table A4: Ex-ante projection of inflation 
 
policy 
rate 
change 
j=0 j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6 j=7 j=8 
1998-1 0 2.6 2.63 2.42 2.41 2.44 2.39 2.47 2.55 2.64 
1998-2 0 2.83 2.35 2.35 2.41 2.37 2.3 2.26 2.27 2.35 
1998-3 0.25 2.51 2.56 2.69 2.83 2.89 2.82 2.75 2.64 2.55 
1998-4 -0.75 2.54 2.56 2.71 2.71 2.51 2.42 2.33 2.24 2.21 
1999-1 -1.25 2.49 2.53 2.55 2.56 2.38 2.26 2.16 2.09 2.18 
1999-2 -0.25 2.48 2.4 2.36 2.19 2.2 2.2 2.17 2.27 2.35 
1999-3 -0.25 2.31 2.28 2.09 1.98 1.85 1.87 2.02 2.2 2.51 
1999-4 0.5 2.2 2.12 2.06 2.04 1.9 1.82 1.92 2.34 2.68 
2000-1 0.5 1.93 1.98 1.95 2.07 2.38 2.58 2.65 2.71 2.73 
2000-2 0 1.88 1.93 2.1 2.2 2.47 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.56 
2000-3 0 2.38 2.28 2.26 2.39 2.48 2.62 2.68 2.7 2.72 
2000-4 0 2.36 2.33 2.22 2.19 2.19 2.18 2.37 2.46 2.56 
2001-1 -0.25 1.94 1.92 1.87 1.86 2.06 2.13 2.21 2.34 2.47 
2001-2 -0.5 1.9 1.9 1.91 1.91 1.94 2.03 2.16 2.39 2.53 
2001-3 -0.25 2.31 2.17 2.17 1.9 1.93 2.08 2.26 2.33 2.37 
2001-4 -1 2 2.03 1.85 2.02 1.95 1.9 1.9 1.91 2.04 
2002-1 0 2.14 1.87 1.96 2.11 2.13 2.13 2.18 2.28 2.34 
2002-2 0 2.02 2.08 2.24 2.18 2.05 2.09 2.26 2.39 2.63 
2002-3 0 1.84 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.31 2.29 2.31 2.41 2.55 
2002-4 0 2.64 2.73 2.72 2.72 2.41 2.38 2.37 2.44 2.46 
2003-1 -0.25 2.77 2.9 2.98 2.77 2.67 2.58 2.52 2.4 2.41 
2003-2 0 3.09 2.9 2.63 2.4 2.35 2.4 2.4 2.44 2.46 
2003-3 -0.25 2.85 2.58 2.3 2.3 2.26 2.23 2.3 2.41 2.56 
2003-4 0.25 2.72 2.55 2.64 2.67 2.64 2.61 2.53 2.62 2.73 
2004-1 0.25 2.32 2.51 2.51 2.54 2.63 2.5 2.49 2.54 2.66 
2004-2 0.25 1.46 1.36 1.39 1.45 1.66 1.82 1.91 2.18 2.35 
2004-3 0.5 1.18 1.22 1.32 1.41 1.61 1.67 1.82 2.19 2.25 
2004-4 0 1.18 1.2 1.36 1.56 1.64 1.72 1.82 1.93 2.01 
2005-1 0 1.54 1.58 1.65 1.72 1.79 1.88 1.98 2.06 2.12 
2005-2 0 1.98 2.06 2.1 2.01 1.86 1.89 1.91 1.93 1.97 
2005-3 -0.25 2.16 2.3 2.18 1.97 1.83 1.68 1.78 1.93 1.97 
2005-4 0 2.23 2.16 2.03 1.84 1.75 1.79 1.81 1.87 1.95 
2006-1 0 1.96 1.94 1.96 1.98 2 2 2 2 2 
2006-2 0 2.27 2.19 2.33 2.35 2.13 2.13 2.13 2.14 2.11 
2006-3 0.25 2.32 2.71 2.75 2.56 2.38 2.23 2.27 2.22 2.19 
2006-4 0.25 2.56 2.67 2.36 2.07 2.07 2.08 2.08 2.11 2.11 
2007-1 0.25 2.9 2.56 2.26 2.07 1.89 1.99 2.07 2.15 2.21 
2007-2 0.25 2.52 2.25 2.07 1.99 1.91 1.91 2.02 2.08 2.13 
2007-3 0.25 2.07 2.1 2.11 2.09 2.11 2.16 2.14 2.16 2.16 
2007-4 0 1.9 2.06 2.14 2.22 2.17 2.08 1.85 1.77 1.74 
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Table A5: Ex-ante projection of GDP growth 
 
policy 
rate 
change 
k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=5 k=6 k=7 k=8 
1998-1 0 3.04  2.33  1.76  1.64  1.59  1.79  2.15  2.41  2.61  
1998-2 0 2.41  1.86  1.71  1.76  1.83  2.11  2.27  2.39  2.56  
1998-3 0.25 2.00  1.69  1.46  1.26  1.38  1.63  1.76  2.15  2.48  
1998-4 -0.75 1.92  1.19  0.85  0.63  0.75  1.08  1.44  1.84  2.36  
1999-1 -1.25 1.12  0.62  0.42  0.46  0.92  1.38  1.88  2.30  2.63  
1999-2 -0.25 0.78  0.96  1.15  1.42  1.63  1.90  2.51  2.91  3.07  
1999-3 -0.25 1.31  1.87  2.36  2.51  2.64  2.71  2.85  2.95  2.98  
1999-4 0.5 2.52  2.88  2.90  2.65  2.60  2.79  2.84  2.94  2.91  
2000-1 0.5 2.94  2.76  2.57  2.38  2.45  2.53  2.52  2.51  2.47  
2000-2 0 2.94  2.58  2.45  2.57  2.61  2.65  2.70  2.74  2.70  
2000-3 0 2.56  2.48  2.50  2.51  2.53  2.63  2.81  2.79  2.76  
2000-4 0 2.73  2.76  2.39  2.31  2.40  2.48  2.51  2.50  2.48  
2001-1 -0.25 2.85  2.27  2.02  2.15  2.01  2.28  2.55  2.75  2.85  
2001-2 -0.5 2.23  1.97  2.36  2.54  2.54  2.53  2.34  2.30  2.34  
2001-3 -0.25 1.61  1.79  1.93  2.19  2.33  2.24  2.17  2.09  2.07  
2001-4 -1 2.06  1.80  1.76  1.75  1.92  2.14  2.37  2.45  2.51  
2002-1 0 1.37  1.48  1.78  2.43  2.76  2.79  2.69  2.61  2.62  
2002-2 0 1.35  1.62  2.32  2.95  2.95  3.15  3.29  3.28  3.13  
2002-3 0 1.82  2.34  2.91  2.75  2.94  3.03  2.91  2.68  2.52  
2002-4 0 2.29  3.06  3.18  3.17  2.97  2.74  2.59  2.48  2.42  
2003-1 -0.25 2.52  2.55  2.28  2.51  2.51  2.31  2.12  1.98  1.99  
2003-2 0 2.38  2.00  2.44  2.94  2.77  2.63  2.38  2.29  2.50  
2003-3 -0.25 1.58  1.74  2.41  2.64  2.77  2.83  2.67  2.53  2.38  
2003-4 0.25 2.15  2.73  2.80  2.91  2.93  3.01  3.01  2.99  2.89  
2004-1 0.25 3.37  3.59  3.54  3.47  3.27  3.20  3.17  3.06  2.91  
2004-2 0.25 3.60  3.73  3.70  3.79  3.47  3.10  2.71  2.39  2.23  
2004-3 0.5 3.71  3.61  3.80  3.59  3.21  2.77  2.30  2.12  2.15  
2004-4 0 2.80  2.70  2.38  2.42  2.38  2.49  2.63  2.82  3.00  
2005-1 0 2.79  2.57  2.77  2.75  2.68  2.71  2.80  2.91  3.04  
2005-2 0 2.56  2.62  2.57  2.64  2.61  2.65  2.75  2.87  3.01  
2005-3 -0.25 2.07  2.08  2.35  2.51  2.65  2.85  3.13  3.23  3.25  
2005-4 0 1.92  2.26  2.36  2.59  2.77  3.04  3.27  3.33  3.27  
2006-1 0 2.22  2.48  2.83  3.01  3.12  3.18  3.19  3.12  3.02  
2006-2 0 2.60  2.86  3.05  3.10  2.98  2.89  2.81  2.75  2.71  
2006-3 0.25 3.13  3.23  3.26  3.24  3.07  3.04  2.97  2.88  2.77  
2006-4 0.25 2.89  3.04  3.13  3.18  3.11  3.04  2.99  2.94  2.90  
2007-1 0.25 3.10  3.23  3.36  3.31  3.20  3.03  2.91  2.86  2.84  
2007-2 0.25 2.88  3.00  3.13  3.21  3.14  3.05  2.94  2.84  2.79  
2007-3 0.25 3.02  2.92  2.90  2.79  2.72  2.64  2.58  2.51  2.51  
2007-4 0 3.19  2.80  2.31  1.93  2.01  2.20  2.45  2.68  2.74  
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Appendix B: Unit root tests  
  
Interest rate  
 T-statistic Prob* 
ADF -0.91 0.94(null: r has a unit root) 
PP -1.16 0.90(null : r has a unit root) 
KPSS LM-statistic: 
0.20 
Null : r is stationary 
Critical values: 
1% level: 0.22; 5% level:0.15; 10% level:0.12 
 
Inflation deviation: 
 j=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ADF -3.32 
(0.07) 
-2.68 
(0.25) 
-2.33 
(0.41) 
-2.12 
(0.52) 
-2.58 
(0.29) 
-3.67 
(0.04) 
-4.36 
(0.006) 
-4.20 
(0.009) 
-3.42 
(0.06) 
PP -1.98 
(0.59) 
-1.13 
(0.91) 
-1.3 
(0.87) 
-0.58 
(0.97) 
-1.65 
(0.76) 
-3.27 
(0.08) 
-4.23 
(0.009) 
-4.23 
(0.009) 
-3.42 
(0.06) 
KPSS 0.13 
(10%) 
0.15 
(5%) 
0.15 
(5%) 
0.16 
(5%) 
0.16 
(5%) 
0.13 
(10%) 
0.099 
ac) 
0.06 
(ac) 
0.096 
ac 
 
GDP growth deviation  
 k=0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
ADF -4.09 
(0.01) 
-4.29 
(0.008) 
-2.71 
(0.24) 
-0.94 
(0.94) 
-1.06 
(0.92) 
-2.54 
(0.31) 
-3.54 
(0.048) 
-3.82 
(0.026) 
-3.75 
（0.03
） 
PP -3.19 
(0.10) 
-2.37 
(0.39) 
-1.74 
(0.71) 
-1.08 
(0.92) 
-1.28 
(0.88) 
-0.73 
(0.96) 
-1.43 
(0.84) 
-2.70 
(0.24) 
-3.58 
(0.04) 
KPSS 0.04 
ac 
0.08 
ac 
0.14 
ac 
0.18 
(5%) 
0.18 
(5%) 
0.17 
(5%) 
0.15 
(5%) 
0.07 
ac 
0.16 
（ac
） 
 
 
 
 
